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Making God Dance: 
Postmodern Theorizing and 
the Christian College 
By Mark S. McLeod 
" ... post this, post that. Everything is post these days, as if we' re all just a footnote to 
something earlier that was real enough to have a name of its own.n -Elaine Risley1 
Just as every past age had its cultural and intellectual story to tell, so do 
we. It is the tale of a postmodern world where nothing is real, a fable where 
everything depends on nostalgia, a rumor in which everyone's beliefs are ac-
ceptable. Thus, evangelical Christians tend to think that postmodernism opposes 
the truth, and in particular, the absolute truth of the gospel. But it is far from 
dear that postmodernism is treacherous. 
That we live in a postmodern world is evident in how academics work 
in their various disciplines. Even though evangelical sc.holars tend to disparage 
postmodernism, we ourselves are often caught up in postmodern thinking. In 
times past, the cultural and intellectual climate of the age molded Christian truth, 
so our being influenced by the spirit of the present age ought to be no surprise. 
Being thus shaped is not an evil, or at least it need not be if we become aware 
of what we are doing. Being postmodern need not entail that we give up on the 
objectivity of the gospel. It is time to take postmodernism seriously and allow 
its positive aspects to influence Christian higher education. 
Postmodernism is rooted in a set of philosophical influences that run con-
trary to the philosophical position most evangelicals hold on the nature of the-
orizing. In order to understand postmodernism and its influence, one needs to 
understand these philosophical positions. My goals are thus to explain briefly 
the standard evangelical philosophy of theorizing as well as a corresponding 
postmodernist position, to illustrate with some examples how postmodernist 
In this essay, Mark S. McLeod describes and advocates a postmodern model of theo-
rizing which he calls "multi-world realismn as an alternative to "common sense realismn 
and the "correspondence theory of truth" which dominate, he maintains, both the West-
ern philosophical tradition and current evangelical thinking. Objectivity is preserved and 
relativism avoided, he argues, by turning to "what is of interest to God, to that in which 
God delights or takes pleasure." He concludes by developing the implications of this view 
. for the various aspects of Christian higher education, noting that a "Christian-Postmodern 
college would be an exciting place to work for the kingdom." Mr. McLeod, until recently a 
faculty member at Westmont College, teaches philosophy and humanities at the University 
of Texas at San Antonio. 
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276 assumptions work themselves out in two academic disciplines, to suggest a 
for the Christian to embrace postmodernism without ceasing to be serl 
Christian, and to illustrate a number of ways in which these changes in 
sophical assumptions would influence the workings of the Christian college. 
I. Evangelical Theorizing 
The traditional philosophical position on theorizing most evangelicals 
maintains that truth is correspondence. It is what many, if not most, 
think of as the common sense view. This view of truth is that our Ii 
terances, to be true, must "match" or "correspond to" an extra-mental 
There are, so to speak, two realms. First is the realm of thoughts, and in p 
lar, propositional-style thoughts-thoughts that are descriptive or declarativ 
nature. Second is the realm of the nonmental world, the world "out there" 
exists external to the human mind. The roots of this idea go as far back as p 
and are as central to Western thought as any other belief or theory. 
Part and parcel with this understanding of truth is the notion that our 
ories or, more broadly speaking, our worldviews2 are true in just this 
namely, that there is a mind-independent set of facts or data to which our 
ries, even the most general ones, match or correspond. Thus, what we do 
we theorize is largely an epistemological project, that is, a project by whi 
come to discover the way the world is, to find the appropriate descrlptio 
to match our thoughts and utterances to a world over which we have no 
Underpinning both the correspondence theory of truth and the notion 
our theories are either true or false is a certain metaphysical theory, the 
that there is a mind-independent world that exists no matter what we think 
it, believe about it, want it to be, or conceive it to be. I'll refer to this vie 
Common Sense Realism, or Realism with a capital "R". According to Re 
there are tables and chairs, trees and rocks, and, in short, the whole pe 
world. Those of us who believe in persons, especially in persons understood 
marily as entities with nonphysical souls, as well as those of us who believ 
supernatural beings-God, angels, demons, and the like-will typically 
our Realism to those beings as well. These beings exist independent of our 
ing about them just as do rocks, trees, tables, and chairs. Although not ph 
they are just as real. Furthermore, Common Sense Realism asserts that th 
only one such world, with only one true description. Thus we sometimes 
to Truth with a capital "T" or the absolute truth. 
II. 01!-r Postmodern World 
The postmodern understanding of the world differs from the pre 
position. A brief account of its roots and development can be helpful. The mo. 
1 Elaine Risley, a character in Margaret Atwood's novel Cat's Eye, New York: Dou 
1988, p. 90. 
2 For ease of discussion, I am suppressing some important distinctions between the 
of theories, world views, conceptual schemes, and the like. 
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world is one in which philosophers say that if we think clearly enough and 277 
with sufficient diligence we can come to the truth. Rene Descartes, for instance, 
thinks that if he trusts only what he can clearly and distinctly perceive (with his 
mind's eye) then God will not let him go astray, at least not too far. Error is 
possible, however, since the will extends further than the intellect, and thus one 
can always go beyond what the evidence supports. Fundamentally, however, 
Descartes believes that clear thinking will guarantee that his beliefs are true; 
he wants, and believes he can have, absolute certainty about some things from 
which he can then infer other things about the world. Mathematical precision 
about one's own mental existence-cogito ergo sum-gives one a firm foundation 
for the existence and nature of the external world-the world of trees, chairs, 
other minds, and God. 
Alas, Descartes's intellectual children are less sanguine about reaching the 
truth. David Hume, unlike Descartes, thinks clear thinking questions the value 
of clear thinking! He philosophizes about mathematics, on the one hand, and 
science on the other. Mathematics, although certain, is not about the real world; 
physics, although purportedly about the real world, is not only not certain but 
does not even rest on something we can show likely to be true. The foundations 
of physics are reducible to the psychological workings of the human mind. 
The final central figure is Immanuel Kant. He responds to David Hume's 
radical skepticism about physics. For all we can tell, says Hume, there is no re-
lationship of cause and effect that is necessary to the physical world. In order 
to rescue physics from the grip of Hume's skepticism, Kant responds with what 
he calls a "transcendental argument." For thinking to be possible at all, he says, 
there must be certain categories of thought that make experience-that is, sen-
suous experience-possible. These categories, such as cause and effect, number, 
and possibility and necessity, along with what he calls the "intuitions of space 
and time," are what make the experience of chairs, trees, tables, and elephants 
possible. But these categories and intuitions are, for Kant, internal to the work-
ings of the human mind. This is Kant's "Copernican revolution." Rather than 
human thought conforming to a world that is independent of human thoughts, 
the so-called "world" really conforms to human thoughts. There is, in short, no 
mind-independent world to which we have access. So what Hume assumes is 
out there causing our experiences is, according to Kant, constituted by internal 
human thought structures. 
It may sound as if Kant says that we have control over what we experience 
so that we can make up the world in whatever way we want. But clearly we 
individuals do not have such control over the world. Just as I see this desk in front 
of me, so would you were you here at the time of this writing. Nothing we can 
do will change that fact. But Kant does not think we can make up the world any 
way we want. There are, Kant says, two 0 worlds." The phenomenal world is the 
world that all of us experience and experience in more or less the same way-the 
world of rocks, trees, tables and chairs. We experience the same world because 
we are all rational creatures sharing exactly the same categories of thought. Thus 
278 we all experience the desk-in-front-of-us. What we do not experience is the 
in-itself. The latter is something from the noumenal world, the world of 
in-themselves, the world of what we might call "true essences." This is aw 
which we do not have access through experience. So although humans do 
an absolutely central role in shaping experience, we all play exactly the 
role, for Kant, since rationality is everywhere the same. 
Kant thinks his theory returns physics to a position of strength, for Hu 
skepticism rests on the assumption that our minds must be able to see or 
the existence of cause and effect. Upon Hume's realizing the impossibility 
perception or inference, he suggests that cause and effect is a psycholo · 
on, a mere unfounded assumption that we humans make to provide 
comfort. But Kant will have none of that; experience does not conditi 
thought but rather thought conditions our experience. If the cause and 
relation is a structure of the human mind, then we need not worry about wh 
we can perceive or infer its existence. The cause and effect relation, and 
similar relations, are what make perception itself possible. In this sense, the 
necessary; necessary for thought but not in the things out there. These re 
are not in the physical world itself; they are part and parcel of the human 
Physics, according to Kant, once again smells like a rose. 
What come out smelling less like a rose are religion, morality, art, and rn 
physics. Kant believes that metaphysics, that branch of philosophy discussing 
existence and nature of God, freewill, and "the true essences of things," can 
be done; or at least cannot be done on the grounds of pure reason. These 
topics for practical reason; issues at best regulative for human life and be 
the firm foundation on which physics rests. 
After Kant comes the slow demise of Enlightenment thought, with its 
sumptions of identical values for all, a religion of reason that any clear th' 
individual would come to believe, and the commitment to reason qua rea 
capability of giving us universally acceptable truth. As Western thinkers re 
that we have no need of the noumenal world, or at least no good reason to 
lieve it exists, the basis for holding to a shared vision of the world (wh 
theology, ethics, art, or physics) begins to collapse. Since rationality is a 
artifact, we enter, in the twentieth century, the postmodern world, a wod 
skepticism, supposed irrationalism, and that bugaboo, relativism. 
The postmodern world is one in which we have only phenomena-what 
experience-and no noumena. But further, it is a world in which the phenom 
are relativized to our point of view, whether that is culturally or indiv 
based. This relativism is present because we no longer think we can d 
the way the world is, since there is no world-in-itself to describe. Thus 
not of the human condition but of the postmodern condition; we talk 
truth but of what is interesting. Literary theorist Jacques Derrida says that 
have no meaning but that the meaning is in the margins of the printed 
Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche has his "will to power" talk-talk that 
that we construct and will into influence our own worldview. Richard 
Making God Dance: Postmodern Theorizing and the Christian College 
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suggests that truth is what our peers will let us get away with. More recently, he 
believes that talk of truth is unimportant and that we should be more concerned 
with what provides us with solidarity rather than objectivity, where the basis of 
solidarity is what is interesting. Postmodernism is, in short, a reaction against 
the rationalism and scientism that dominated the Enlightenment and its legacy 
that we continue to live with in the twilight of the twentieth century. 
In contrast to Common Sense Realism, a weak postmodern stance on truth 
suggests that if there is truth, it is not something to which we have access. A 
stronger position found among postmodernist theorists is that truth is relative to 
the broader theory one puts forth. Truth is not, then, correspondence to facts that 
exist independent of one's theory about them. Rather, facts and hence truth itself 
are shaped and influenced by the theories one holds. Not only is one's perception 
and understanding of reality formed by one's theoretical position; reality itself is 
so formed. Of course, the community of scholars among whom one works either 
supports or criticizes one's theory, and this is an important aspect of theorizing. 
But there is no way by which one can remove oneself from history and test one's 
theory for truth. Truth begins to sound relativistic on such a view, and this is 
more than merely an epistemological issue. 
III. Postmodemism and the Disciplines 
Some examples from various disciplines help to illustrate how postmodern 
thinking affects our work. The point here is not to convince anyone that postmod-
.emism is the proper way to think of the world but rather to explore briefly how, 
as a matter of course, we have taken on postmodern assumptions. I'll give only 
two examples, but they could be multiplied, since postmodernist assumptions 
affect all the disciplines. The issue thus is pedagogical rather than argumentative. 
Consider history. Most first-year college students think of history as "facts." 
But the contemporary historian tells us that "history takes place in the mind of 
the historian."3 Yes, there are "facts" -the data with which the historian works-
but "facts" are understood in the context of what the individual historian thinks, 
a context the historian constructs. Thus one has Christian views of history, but 
these views give us little to rely on except postmodern assumptions. For example, 
in a recent issue of the Christian Scholar's Review, historian Mark Noll claims that 
one goal of his essay on the possibility of knowledge about the past is to show 
that "a Christian perspective on knowledge can provide not only a, but the 
best foundation for restoring confidence in the human ability to know the past 
reliably." When it comes to fulfilling his goal, however, the best Noll can say 
is that although "Christian teaching offers a solution to the crisis of historical 
knowledge ... [by providing] reasons for a chastened realism about our grasp of 
history" this is only a solution if Christianity itself is true. He continues: "But 
how, then, if we have acknowledged that Christianity does not support naively 
3 Rebecca L. M. McLeod, in conversation. 
280 objectivist modes of demonstration, can we recommend Christianity as t 
One answer is to assert that an apology for Christianity must begin where 
knowledge of the past begins, with an understanding that is relative to our 
perspectives."4 These are, frankly, admissions that the canons of rationality 
internal to a system of beliefs-in this case Christian beliefs-and one must 
even more forcefully why one should believe Christianity. 
Perhaps all Noll is suggesting is that there is no theory-neutral starting polt\~ 
epistemically. Suppose we grant that for the moment. On those grounds 
we have no reason to suppose that the Christian position is, in fact, "th 
foundation, nor even that it is better than others. Won't the Marxist historian 
us an equally rational story? And won't she take Marxism to be true? From 
framework the result is, as one historian is fond of saying, "history where: 
names and dates have been changed to protect the historian, but the conclus· 
are always the same."5 The problem is that all historians come to their 
with framework assumptions that influence how they take the facts or, to stat~ 
more forcefully, enable them to "create" facts. Facts are theory conditioned 
this understanding of history is, I suggest, not simply Kantian but the result 
post-Kantian assumptions in which the noumenal world has been not only s 
arated from the phenomenal world but is denied any purchase on our thinklt\ 
whatsoever. Why then think there is a noumenal world? Why does the his 
need it? To suggest that the issue is only an epistemic one is to make a 
tion without a functional difference. The historian, even the Christian histo • 
works as if history has no noumenal framework. 
Postmodernism is also central in theology. David Tracy, a theologian at 
University of Chicago Divinity School, writes the following: 
I have suggested the need for two criteria: "meaningfulness" as disdosive of our 
experience and meaning-as-internal-coherence as applicable to any cognitive claims. 
these two criteria combined will not suffice philosophically. In the case of cognitive 
we want to know not only whether they are meaningful and coherent, but also w 
they are "true." To respond to that last and most demanding question, one final 
philosophical criteria are demanded: criteria of "adequacy to experience. "6 
Read carefully how Tracy explains "adequacy to experience." 
It [experience or language] is "true" when transcendental or metaphysical analysis s 
its "adequacy to experience" by explicating how a particular concept (e.g., time, space, 
or God) functions as a fundamental "belief" or "condition of possibility" of all our e 
[italics mine ].7 
One could hardly be more Kantian, except that Tracy has moved what 
considered to be issues of practical reason (self and God) into the realm of p 
4 Mark Noll, "Traditional Christianity and the Possibility of Historical Knowledge," C 
tian Scholar's Review vol. XIX, 4, pp. 394, 404, 405. 
5 Rebecca L. M. McLeod, in conversation. 
6 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology, Minneapolis: S 
Press, 1975, pp. 70, 71. 
7 Ibid., p. 71. 
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we can know by pure reason, according to Kant, and to move them into the 
"inner circle" is to change substantially Kant's position. Since it seems obvious 
enough to most people that the concept of God, at least, is not a "condition of 
possibility" of one's experience, and yet Tracy apparently thinks it is, it appears 
tbat there is little theory-neutral ground epistemically. Is this simply an epistemic 
issue? No, since Tracy is giving an account of "truth," not simply rationality or 
knowledge. At the very least he does not distinguish well between metaphysics 
and epistemology. While this alone does not make him a postmodernist, it calls 
attention to the fact that he has little reason not to be. Truth is embedded in a 
theory, a story, a way of seeing "the world" with which not everyone would 
agree or, perhaps, could agree. 
IV. A Postmodernist Theory of "Truth" 
One postmodern position on theorizing is what I call "Multi-world 
Realism."B On this view, "truth" is theory conditioned. This is a metaphysi-
cal claim that moves beyond simply holding that there are no theory-neutral 
epistemic starting points. The reason there are no theory-neutral starting points 
epistemically is that there is no theory-neutral truth. Of the competing positions 
on what the truth is in a given situation, none is better than the others from 
the standpoint of some objectively True (Truth with a capital "T") description. 
There are only different positions; there is no objectively True description. The 
Common Sense Realist is stuck on the notion of Truth understood as a single, 
objective story. Consider an alternative. 
As the story goes, truth is such a small portion of what is valuable and 
interesting. Truth (lower case) is limited to language, and even there only to a 
relatively small portion of language, namely, declarative, descriptive sentences. 
What about the novel, or poetry? What of metaphor or, more broadly, symbol? 
What of the plastic arts? In these areas it is curious to talk about truth at all, 
but especially Truth. Instead there is what we can call "rightness of rendering."9 
The notion of rightness of rendering includes the notion of truth, but extends 
to others as well. Think of the novel. We have a rather curious saying about 
good novels; we say that they "ring true." While this sounds as if we are saying 
that the novel is (literally) true, in fact we are only applying the word "truth" 
metaphorically. What literally "rings true" is a bell. A bell rings true when its 
quality and tone are what was intended by the bell maker, but there is nothing 
for the bell's sound to correspond to "out there." And so when we say a novel 
3 The "Multi-world Realist" name is one I attach to the theories of Nelson Goodman, on 
which work much of what I have to say in this section is based. See Goodman, Ways of 
Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978, for fuller development of his position. 
There are other possibilities here but for the sake of space I've concentrated on Multi-world 
Realism. One might consider, as another alternative, Hilary Putnam's "internal realism." 
See his The Many Faces of Realism, LaSalle: Open Court, 1988. 
t See Goodman. 
282 rings true, we do not say that it corresponds to the mind-independent world, but 
rather that it works as it was intended to, or that it coheres together by creating, 
a plausible world. Such worlds are, however, fictional. . , 
What happens if we take fictional truth as a model (although not complete) 
for how truth works in nonfictional, theoretical settings? The result is that th~f 
declarative utterance is made true in the world in which it is made. This is !14:1; 
not because of a noumenal or extramental world to which the utterance matche~" 
but because what counts as true is decided largely by the theoretical framewor~ 
And literal truth will vary world to world. There may be contradictions within;f 
given world, but there will be no contradictions across the worlds. There is, 
no need for a notion of objective Truth. Truth (lower case) can be explained · 
nally, that is, only by reference to the hermeneutic circle in which the utteranc 
are made. This explains why we have no epistemically neutral starting point. 
Other kinds of worlds work similarly. The fictional utterance is made t 
by its fictional world, but the metaphorical expression is no different. It is 
metaphorically, so to speak, in the world in which it is made. We know pede 
well what it means to say that a man is a cactus and we know that such 
attribution has limits. But this is not literally true predication or attribution 
would not be a contradiction to say that a man is both a cactus and not a cact 
if one is talking across worlds. Nevertheless, the predication will apply to 
men and not others, and rightly so. A man is a cactus only if he is prickly~· 
that is, rude, hurtful, and self-protective. Of course, the metaphor's applicatio1}' 
is dependent upon circumstances, but that should be no surprise by now. 
There are nonrepresentational notions of rightness as well. What does th~ 
abstract artist do when she paints? She creates, when she does it well, a rigllt 
rendering of the abstract world. This is not to say that her painting represen~ 
some extra-painting reality, but its rightness might consist of rightness of 
or rightness of expression. A painter cannot just do anything on canvas. P · 
have limits created by the canvas, the oils or water colors, and so forth. But t 
are also limits of design; some "get at" what the artist wants, others do not. 
There are many worlds, not just one. The worlds are worlds in which th 
are multiple layers of "rightness of rendering," worlds that are juxtaposed, 
lapping, and created by fiction. The person I've been calling the Common S 
Realist falls short of telling the whole story because she thinks the story can 
told simply in terms of Truth. In particular, the Common Sense Realist rejects 
notion of more than one world understood as alternative descriptions true 
internally, that is, by reference to the various theories. For the Multi-world 
ist, there are many schemes, conceptual and otherwise, that create many worl 
and we live in more than one of these worlds at the same time. Not only is th 
no way to tell which world is the True world, but there is no reason, there 
no noumenal world, for thinking that there is a single,, True world descri 
Nevertheless, the Multi-world Realist does not believe in relativism where j 
anything goes (the concern with rightness of rendering is important here). 
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go (the many worlds talk is important here). 
The Multi-world Realist says, in short, not only that there are conceptual 
schemes that influence the facts, but that there are other metaphysical concerns 
beside facts; "truth" is not the only important human construct. In other words, 
when we human beings theorize-about history, social relationships, the soul or 
what have you-we are making worlds. For the Multi-world Realist there is no 
noumenal world, and in its place there are multiple worlds created by human 
beings. Facts, truths, and values are made, not found. 
Another way by which one can come to understand Multi-world Realism 
is to consider what the artist does. We tend to think about theories as human 
descriptions of the world and the way it works; Realism with a capital "R". Thus 
there are things "out there" -found objects or artifacts-that we try to describe 
with our theories and other utterances. But the artist is not a theorist, so one 
question to ask is what the artist makes. Art objects have an odd status from 
the point of view of Common Sense Realism. They are not exactly objects that 
we find in the world, nor are they simply artifacts. Neither are they theories. 
What are they? 
The dichotomy between theories, conceptual schemes, and thought on the 
one hand, and the world, facts, and artifacts on the other, is what creates the 
puzzlement about artworks. It is not the artworks themselves. What the artist 
does when she creates a painting or sculpture is to create a new reality or, in 
Multi-world Realism's terms, a new world. She is not trying to copy or represent 
the world, or at least not all artists are; nor is she simply rearranging bits of pieces 
of the real world. She is, in fact, doing the same thing the rest of us do when 
we theorize about the so-called "real world." She is not copying it, or trying to 
correspond to it, but rather she is making a new world. It is precisely this that 
we do when we theorize, although in a different way. 
Let me paraphrase briefly a contemporary theory of artworks10 and then 
apply it to theories as a means of clarification. What happens when the artist 
takes an ordinary bed, bolts it to the floor of a museum, and paints a large 
stripe across it? What changes the ordinary bed into an artwork? It is not that 
the artist intends it to be a work of art, nor that something is expressed, nor 
that the work is in a museum. Rather it is that the artworld-the critics, the 
theorists, the museum-goers-"baptize" the work a work of art. For example, 
when cubism first came to be, the cubists were putting forth a potentially new 
reality. It was not a reality, however, until the artworld surrounded it, began 
to evaluate and explain it, and began to talk about its relationship to earlier 
schools of art. Then the cubist objects became works of art. They changed their 
ontological or metaphysical status, according to this view, from being mere paint 
10 See Arthur Danto, "The Artistic Enfranchisement of Real Objects: The Artworld," in 
G. Dickie, R. Sclafani, and R. Roblin, eds., Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1990. 
284 marks to works of art. They did not become real until there was a theorettatf;.: 
context for them. In other words, there is no essence to the work of art; artwor~·' 
are contextually dependent realities. . · 
How does this translate into the ontology or metaphysics of theories? 
said earlier, our theories are new realities as well. There is no dichotomy betw~~ 
the world "out there" and our theories; our theories are the world or, ·· 
exactly, the worlds. Art objects do not fall into the cracks between theories 
the world; they are the nonlinguistic counterpart to theories. So theories are 
worlds, or at least parts of new worlds where the other parts are the "facts~ 
"data." A theory becomes a new world when other theories and ideas surrou 
it and "baptize" it a new world. 
What then do we do when we theorize, according to this account? We 
not try to discover the world, nor do we engage in an epistemic project. 
we make worlds; we are, as the artists have often been before us, creators 
realities. So according to the Multi-world Realist, there are many worlds, so 
of which contain true and false predications; others, fictionally true and 
predications; still others, metaphorically true and false predications; and yet 
others, nonrepresentational expressions of reality, and so forth. 
V. Making Multi-world Realism Christian 
What does the Christian say of all this? Typically, the Christian, at least 
orthodox Christian and in particular, the evangelical .Christian, takes Corn 
Sense Realism and its concomitant view of theories and truth to be ne 
for Christianity. There is, as philosopher Hilary Putnam points out, sornet 
right about Common Sense Realism, namely, that of course there are tables 
chairs, and that any philosophical theory that tells us otherwise is '1 more 
slightly crazy." 11 It is natural for us to talk about the real world being out the~j 
and Christians are no exception to this natural talk. But this is true not j~t 
for Christians but for all of us. What is especially important about Realism fot 
Christians? There is, first of all, the exclusivistic claims of Christ who says 0 1 
the way, the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but by me." This 
of exclusivism seems to rule out any kind of relativism, and it is relativism 
people fear when one begins to talk of different points of view or, more stro 
different worlds. Indeed, it is the fear that such talk will remove Christi 
from its status as "the only true religion" that makes any kind of antirealism 
idealism repugnant to orthodox Christians. 
Evangelicals seem to have an extra burden to bear in regard to truth. 
not only want to make truth claims that avoid relativism but we have a 
trine of Scripture that weighs down the wheel barrow. For us it is our a 
exclusively propositional understanding of revelation that seems to force us 
a correspondence theory of truth and its near neighbor, Common Sense 
ism. Furthermore, our doctrine of revelation, and in particular our claims a 
11 Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, p. 33. 
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the inerrancy of Scripture, are rooted in a certain philosophical vision of the 285 
world; namely, a modern vision that suggests that we can describe the world 
in language stripped of metaphor. What is behind this philosophical view, or 
embedded in it, is a desire for objectivity. We think that objectivity should be 
cashed out in terms of Truth construed as completely independent of our minds 
and their contents; what is True is True and nothing we can say, do, or think has 
any influence on it. And we think this because Jesus claims to be the Truth, and 
nothing we can say, do, or think about him changes him. 
I propose for consideration that Common Sense Realism is fraught with 
problems and that we should turn to a modification of Multi-world Realism. 
Why would a Christian, and in particular an evangelical, want to reject Common 
Sense Realism? Let me highlight two difficulties. 
First is what I take to be a certain kind of skepticism that comes with Com-
mon Sense Realism. We live in a world in which the supposedly universal cat-
egories that Western intellectuals once thought we all shared have collapsed. 
What I wish to suggest is that the skeptical strain in postmodernism can be 
traced right to the Common Sense picture of reality and its related understand-
ing of Truth as correspondence. If one holds that there is a world completely 
mind-independent, one creates a gulf that has to be bridged. The road leading 
up to this gulf, the one running through the history of philosophy, is strewn 
with unsuccessful attempts at bridge building. One way to avoid the skepticism, 
and hence the need to build such bridges, is to avoid creating the gap in the first 
place. Hence, Common Sense Realism ought to be rejected. 
My second reason for rejecting Common Sense Realism is the variety of 
replies one gets to this question: Just which world do we think is Real? The 
person on the street tells us that it is the earth on which she stands, along with the 
rocks, trees, tables, chairs, and the multitude of other medium-sized objects we 
can perceive. The scientist in the lab, or perhaps the philosopher in her study, tells 
us that that world is mere projection. The Real world is the world we cannot see, 
the world of neutrons, protons, quarks, and a myriad of other tiny bits and pieces. 
And not even the scientists can really agree. Do we live in a world in which 
light is waves, particles, or both? Do quarks really exist, physically? Or are they 
mathematical constructs, part of a grand mathematical map for getting around 
in the fictional subatomic world? Are they simple or do they have component 
parts? Now which is it? And how do we tell? 
That we can even frame these questions points to the underlying, and strong, 
intuitions of Common Sense Realism. These intuitions notwithstanding, there are 
reasons to reject Common Sense Realism. Realism with a capital "R" is, as Putnam 
suggests, rather like the seducer in old-fashioned melodramas, always making 
promises to the innocent maiden, common sense. But as the innocent maiden 
should not trust the seducer, common sense should not trust Realism with a 
capital "R." We should look elsewhere, for the intuitions behind it do not tell the 
whole story. We should look to postmodern theories like Multi-world Realism. 
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the world, or, more properly speaking, the worlds. He or she must, it seems, 
ignore the intuition behind Common Sense Realism. This intuition might be 
in Putnam's terms, namely, that there really are rocks, trees, pigs, and elephants; 
But this generates all kinds of confusion by its appeal to our everyday languaS': • · 
of "the real" and "the true." To avoid this, let us speak in terms of objectivity, 
The intuition behind our tendency to accept Common Sense Realism is not it$ 
claims about reality or truth, but rather its attempt to secure objectivity. Thus, 
what is behind the Christian emphasis on Realism is the need for objectivity, 
But objectivity is not, I suggest, the same thing as so-called "objective Truth."' •. 
Objectivity simply demands some nonarbitrary ground of things, not a third" 
person point of view from which truth can be judged. 
For objectivity the Christian need not turn to a Common Sense Realist ver~. 
sion of reality with its concomitant correspondence theory of Truth. Instead one• 
need only turn to God, and in particular, to what is of interest to God, to thaf 
in which God delights or takes pleasure. The reason I focus on God's interests it 
that we should understand God as having neither beliefs nor theories. While he 
is able to listen to beliefs and theories, and understand them, he cannot be said 
have beliefs that are true because he has no beliefs at all. In short, the objectivity• 
that we Christians demand is found not in God's true beliefs, but in what he···· 
takes an interest in, that to which he pays special attention, that which causes)· 
him pleasure. What makes our theories objective is not some world external to 
our minds but rather that God takes delight in them, that they make God dance., 
Our theories can be wrong-note that I did not say false. They can be wrong if' 
God does not approve of them, if God finds them uninteresting. Furthermore,;:. 
there can be more than one theory that is right, since God can find more thai:t ·• 
one thing interesting. And beliefs can be true, but only within the theory ot, ; 
more broadly speaking, worldview in which the belief is held. But what is tru~ ; 
given the conditions of one theory or worldview may not be true in another. Of 
course one cannot say that they contradict one another across the worlds, for thaf.• 
assumes a third-person point of view, a noumenal world. That is precisely what> 
is rejected on this account. None of this means that just anything will go, fof. 
God will not approve of just anything. Some theories do not make God dance. 
Consider a brief illustration. Is the Calvinist or Arminian picture of the' 
world true? This question, so far as it is a question about two theories, cannot be, 
answered. But one can say that God might (and I suspect will) approve of bot1t 
views. This may occur not because God shows them consistent (that would bring' 
in a noumenal world again) but because he delights in both ways of our human · 
dealings with the problem of foreordination. What kinds of things might God be{ 
displeased with? I suppose he will not delight in a theory that claims that God: 
does not exist (and this I surmise on the basis of my evangelical theology, not'.. 
some theory-independent position). But note that we will not know these thingtt. 
in this life; the objectivity I am suggesting has a strong eschatological component,:, 
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in which he finds delight. In this life and for us, however, tolerance is mandatory. 
VI. Postmodern Theorizing and the Christian College 
I explore some of the implications for Christian higher education in this last 
section. These are neither in order of preference nor importance. The first several 
deal with curricular issues and the last with administrative concerns. 
There is much talk on evangelical college campuses of the "Christian world-
view." Such talk is very important; it is, in many ways, the distinctive of the 
evangelical college. From the Christian-Postmodern point of view, however, it 
is less than clear that the Christian worldview should be taken as monolithic. 
While it is true that the Christian worldview is a competitor against others, both 
religious and nonreligious, it is neither fair nor wise to ignore the "competitors" 
within our own camp. What is the Christian worldview? Is it the evangelical 
worldview or does it extend to Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Asian-Christian, or 
African-Christian points of view?12 And what of the Reformed worldview or the 
Wesleyan worldview or the Southern-California-Bible-and-Community-Church 
worldview? We tend to speak as if the worldview we evangelicals (of whatever 
stripe) hold is the only Christian worldview. A recognition of the variety and rich-
ness of the many worlds we create by our theorizing and creative work should 
lead us to a more sympathetic reading of other Christian traditions. This in turn 
will help us to deal with the variety of nonreligious challenges to our faith. 
Let's explore just a few of the implications of a broader understanding of 
worldviews. First, consider the student who becomes convinced that evangel-
icalism is based on faulty assumptions about Scripture and wonders whether 
Christianity is true. How should an instructor help such a student? Throwing 
yet another InterVarsity book to her is not likely to help. Why not have her read 
some of the great classics of Catholic spirituality or give her Pascal's advice to 
take holy water and mass? Why not encourage her to study liturgy or poetry 
as a means to moving toward a more mature faith? Or perhaps we should have 
her read some Barthian theology. 
Second, why are we so worried about hiring Catholics for our faculties?13 
Wouldn't the diversity do us well? The concern is, of course, that our evangelical 
heritage might be eaten away by such moves, but there are other ways to protect 
our heritage. Why not look for Catholics who understand and are sympathetic 
to evangelicalism? Why not hire Catholics but limit the number of tenure-track 
positions to which we can appoint them? Or why not have visiting professorships 
which could be held by Catholics?14 
12 Here, of course, one must look for differences among these points of view as well, both 
against one another and within a given tradition. 
13 The same is true for faculty of other Christian traditions as well, but there are far more 
American Catholics who could ably teach in evangelical colleges than American Orthodox, 
for example. 
14 It might do the evangelical colleges a great deal of good to have other nonevangelicals 
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ology. A major part of our Christian worldviews comes from our theologies and 
it might be thought that, since God does not have theories (on the Christ~ 
Postmodern view) we shouldn't have theories about him. But the Ch 
Postmodern point of view does not imply that we cannot theorize about 
In fact, we can do theology pretty much the way it is done according to 
traditions in which we find ourselves-Reformed, Baptist, Methodist, Cath 
Orthodox, and so forth. The big difference is that although we can do theo 
different, and perhaps radically different, theologies can be right, according 
Christian Multi-world Realism, since there will be different worlds created 
the theorizing and we live in those different worlds. God can bless or 
them, as is his pleasure, but he has made us such that more than one v 
can be acceptable and quite livable. Theology is just theorizing and ought 
be treated as a special, divinely inspired subject of inquiry, at least so far 
Christian Multi-world Realism itself is concerned.15 
Of course this raises the difficult issue of other non-Christian worldv' 
Doesn't Christian Multi-world Realism not just allow for different Christian 
sitions but different religious traditions as well? This is a complex matter; 
respond only briefly. First, not just any view will go, according to the Chri 
Multi-world Realist. As noted above, one suspects that God will not, overall, 
pleased with theories that imply that God does not exist. Second, surely there a~ 
many things in non-Christian thought over which God finds himself delighted'; 
This is not to say that he finds everything so. Third, Christian Multi-world R~· 
alism is not a theory of salvation. It is a theory of theorizing. There is nothing 
in it tl:tat demands that God save everyone. 
One particular area of theology where evangelicals are sensitive is the d~ 
trine of Scripture. Note that there is nothing in Christian Multi-world Realism th~.· 
entails that one cannot hold to a high view of Scripture, even one that attribut~ 
inerrancy to the original autographs. Such a doctrinal position is embedded ~ 
a theory, as are all others, and, from our evangelical point of view, it is one il:f 
which God delights. It is not, presumably, the only one in which he delights. !be' 
importance of inerrancy is not that it makes us Christian, but that it ma 
evangelical Protestants of a particular stripe. What the theory does imply is 
certain understandings of inerrancy are ruled out, for they depend too hea 
on a positivist account of propositional truth that rules out world-making. 
If theology, and theorizing more generally, are not so central as we typ. 
ically treat them, then the role of the arts on Christian college campuses ~. 
become more important and less peripheral than they currently are. We ha 
(I mean "liberal" Christians) in visiting professorships, but this is probably a. practi 
impossibility now. Hiring some orthodox Catholics is a good beginning. 
15 William Hasker pointed out to me that God might take special delight in our theologi 
and hence theology might indeed have a special role for us. I admit this is correct, but 
point in the text is that Christian Multi-world Realism doesn't itself suggest this. It 
allows it. 
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arts mislead, lie, or seduce. We share this in common with Plato. But according 
to Multi-world Realism, the arts make new realities, just as theorizing does~ The 
arts, and in particular the arts as practiced by Christians, do not need to represent 
the world; they do not need to communicate. That is the job of theorizing with its 
truth-rootedness. The notion of truth doesn't apply to the arts, or at least to the 
plastic arts. This is not to say there are no standards of rightness in the arts; there 
very well may be Christian standards of rightness in the arts. But here we are 
not talking about truth. We need not even be talking about right representation. 
There is plenty of good art that is abstract and nonrepresentational. 
Literature, unlike the plastic arts, has as its main component language. As 
such, its role is perhaps more communicative. But literature is closer, in certain 
respects, to the plastic arts than to other, more discursive, theorizing. As such, 
Christian, and in particular evangelical, literature need not stick so closely to 
telling the gospel tale in predictable ways. Truly evangelical literature is virtually 
nonexistent. We borrow much of our literature from non-evangelicals such as C. 
S. Lewis. This need not be the case, and taking on Christian Multi-world Realism 
can help us change it. There are many reasons for this change. Beside the need 
for Christian creativity, there is the necessity for Christian voices to be heard 
in our larger society. We cannot influence the world if we speak to no one but 
ourselves. Christian literature that is "ghettoized" in stores with names like "The 
Scripture Stall" simply will not be read by the larger population. Where then is 
the witness; where then is the evangelical stance? Should we let the television 
ministers be the only representatives of evangelicalism? 
If the arts are disparaged on some evangelical campuses, the sciences are 
raised to near-divine stature in American society at large. But, according to the 
Christian Multi-world Realist, the social and physical sciences are no less theo-
retical in the sense I've suggested than any of the humanities. The sciences are 
making reality just as the humanities are; they are no more, or less, objective 
than the humanities. The point of Christian Multi-world Realism for those in 
the sciences is to realize that the world viewed through our eyes, and even the 
world viewed through the eyes of a poet, are no less real than the world viewed 
through a microscope. There is, in short, nothing sacrosanct about the sciences or 
the so-called scientific method. Scientists have no special access to truth. They, 
too, are story-tellers. And the technologists, those cousins of the scientist-the 
doctors, the computer whizzes, the clinical psychologists, in short, the "applied" 
experts--are likewise in no better (or worse) shape than those in the humanities. 
We are all working toward constructing realities in such a way as to delight God. 
A final reflection on curricular matters. A flagpole at Christian colleges, but 
perhaps especially central at the Christian College Consortium schools, is the 
mandate for the integration of faith and learning. One is to take one's faith as 
the touchstone for all one does, and one is to understand the various disciplines 
accordingly. It seems, however, that this notion of the integration of faith and 
learning has itself taken on certain Enlightenment or positivistic understandings 
290 of the world. Faith is something other than learning; faith is something other 
than truth. But this still treats the sacred and the secular as two separate areas of 
life. No matter how much we say that the one who integrates her faith with her 
learning will not isolate the sacred from the secular, mere words to that effect 
will not win the day so long as she has to integrate two separate worlds. 
On Christian Multi-world Realism, the notion of the integration of faith 
learning should disintegrate. There is no world of faith that is separate from the .. · 
worlds of science, history, or art. All worlds are human constructs and, under the • 
hand of God, aim at pleasing him. To think that faith is some sort of an add-ori; 
harks back to positivism. There is nothing "out there" to integrate; our theories ·'. 
make the world integrated, at least when done well. The good Christian historian;· 
just is a good historian; the good Christian physicist just is a good physicist. In. · 
short, one's faith is one's learning. 
Consider a Christian philosopher teaching in a "secular" university rather 
than a Christian college. It is not dear that one should be doing much different in. 
the two settings. Why shouldn't one say the same things about theism at the state : 
university that one says in the Christian college classroom? If one believes the 
arguments for God's existence are of little epistemic value, then one's students ori 
the secular campus need to know that, as well as one's students at the Christian 
school. If one thinks religious experience takes us to truth about God, then why·• 
shouldn't one argue that in the secular university as well as in the Christian 
college? Can't one "integrate" one's faith and life in the secular setting as well 
as in the Christian setting? Of course, in the secular setting one may not be 
able to call attention explicitly to (what one hopes is) the biblical root of one'$ 
philosophy,16 but one's theorizing won't change from one context to the other. < 
A good education is a Christian education.17 
There are, finally, several points I wish to make about changes in adminiS-: 
tration that should come about if the theory outlined here were taken seriously. 
The first thing to note is that Christian college administrators need to take faculty 
research seriously. There are two basic reasons for this. The first is that if we are1 
indeed, creating new realities in which God delights, we are not the only ones ; 
attempting to create new realities. If we are to have an influence in the worldi 
if we are to shape it toward God's kingdom, then we must be on the cutting 
edge of scholarship and creative work. Second, if we are to teach students how ~ 
to create, we are going to have to do the hard work of creation as faculty., Thi$ •: 
16 And this is largely for pragmatic reasons rather than theoretical ones, or at least it could< 
be so argued. · 
17 George Marsden suggests in "The Soul of the American University" (reprinted in Fac-
ulty Dialogue, Fall 1991) that postmodernism's stance (what he calls "post-1960s university 
pluralism") seems to allow for a Christian voice. In fact, he suggests that what Christiani 
should urge is a broader pluralism that would include a Christian point of view. I've won-: 
dered when someone is going to test the separation of church and state interpretations' 
by explicitly presenting and defending a Christian point of view in a secular university: · 
philosophy classroom. Why not, given pluralism? 
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loads and to fund research and creative work. To hide our lack of research be-
hind the claim that we are "teaching colleges" is to cheat our students. One's 
research is an essential part of one's teaching. That is not to say that one has 
to be publishing one's work in the best journals or showing one's creative work 
in New York galleries (although these things certainly don't hurt the Christian 
mission), but one does have to be a working scholar, producing new realities 
and new ways of understanding those realities, in order to be a superior teacher. 
This will not happen until sufficient faculty are hired, and sufficient facilities are 
· in place, for first-rate research fo develop. 
A second issue is that the administrators will have to hire the best-trained 
Christian minds in the country, even if some of them do not quite fit into the 
mold of the particular college. This is not to say that one shouldn't worry about 
"fit," but one shouldn't worry about it too much. And the administrators will 
need to explain these faculty to the constituency, and defend them if necessary, 
so that the faculty can be kept on. Christian colleges need to become places that 
foster real scholarship. They need to be producing excellent scholars and artists 
for the next generation. This will not happen on the Christian college campuses 
if administrators are not willing to hire, support, and keep the best Christian 
minds of the age. 
A third and final comment for the administrative side of the evangelical 
college is that administrators will have to promote the Christian college differ-
ently. We are not just about the business of integrating faith and learning. We are 
about the business of influencing the world with ideas. We are not just about the 
business of giving good Bible training, but we are about the business of thinking 
biblically, no matter where this takes the student. We are not just about the busi-
ness of keeping up our evangelical image for the constituency, but we are about 
the business of changing that image both for the constituency and for the larger 
world in which we find ourselves. Parents send their children, and students come, 
to evangelical schools to receive a Christian education. And well they should. 
But a Christian education is not tame. It is, on these Christian-Postmodern sug-
gestions, ever new and challenging. Our public relations presentations need to 
include this. Students will not necessarily be safe at the Christian-Postmodern 
college, if "safe" means the same old evangelical story. But they will be secure 
in the objective arms of a God who made them creative agents, no matter where 
their Christian theorizing takes them. 
VU. Conclusion 
There is much more that needs to be said about Christian Multi-world Re-
alism, both in its defense and in its implications for Christian higher education. 
A brief summary and final word will have to suffice. My thesis is that there is 
no noumenal, mind-independent world; there are, instead, many worlds that are 
created by human theorizing and creative work. Common Sense Realism ought 
to be rejected and replaced with Multi-world Realism. A number of important 
implications follow for Christian higher education. They are best summed up by 
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as the image of God quite seriously. In particular, it takes the notion of our ca" 
pability as creators to be central to the educational enterprise. We are involved 
in making things and theories for our delight as well as for God's. The central 
core of Christian education should thus be teaching the next generation how 10· ·· 
be more creative in its theorizing, in its story telling, in its art, in its witnessing, •· 
and in its living. 
And so to close, what are we to say of theorizing, truth, and Christian~ 
education in our postmodern world? While theories are important, since they ; 
make worlds, they cannot be said to be true. But they can be said, when they are 
right, to make God delighted. Our goal as human theorizers, then, is to make. ' 
interesting worlds that give God pleasure. And when God takes pleasure, wt ·• 
can feel his pleasure. In short, our goal is to dance with God. May the Christian. · 
colleges do so.18 
18 I am indebted to a number of people and institutions for help with this paper. A. R. 
"Pete" Diamond, Rebecca L. M. McLeod, and Shirley A. Mullen all read various drafts oft~. 
paper. The Westmont College chapter of Phi Kappa Phi invited me to present an earlier, an~ 
much different, version of the paper as the Fall 1990 Faculty Lecture. Dean George "Bud9 
Blankenbaker and Westmont College provided a Faculty Development Grant supporting •• 
the writing of that version of the paper. Stanley Obitts and Jonathan Leech responded to · 
the lecture. Finally, Jay Van Hook and William Hasker of Christian Scholar's Review gave.· 
helpful and sometimes much needed advice, both editorial and philosophical. 
